Self-reference of knowledge in the strong programme of the sociology of knowledge

Authors

  • Alexander V. Kabanov Orel State University named after I.S. Turgenev, Orel, Russian Federation

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24866/1997-2857/2021-2/97-104

Keywords:

strong programme, sociology of knowledge, self-reference of knowledge, performative knowledge, social institution, theory of meaning, constructivism

Abstract

The article deals with certain aspects of the epistemological position of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge, namely social constructivism, self-reference of knowledge and nonetheless realistic stance towards the world. The very combination of constructivism (and self-reference for that matter) with realism is by no means frequent and deserves special argumentation. This is precisely what David Bloor and his colleagues try to do. His approach implies the analysis of some popular individualistic theories of meaning (and likewise theories of intentionality) and – by showing their inadequateness – suggests the social theory of meaning. The social semantics, from his point of view, implies self-reference of knowledge on the one hand, and a realistic position on the other. The implications of this position are analyzed in the article.

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Author Biography

  • Alexander V. Kabanov, Orel State University named after I.S. Turgenev, Orel, Russian Federation

    postgraduate student, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Methodology of Science, Faculty of Philosophy

References

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Published

25-07-2025

How to Cite

Self-reference of knowledge in the strong programme of the sociology of knowledge. (2025). Humanities Research in the Russian Far East, 2, 97-104. https://doi.org/10.24866/1997-2857/2021-2/97-104