Cognitive distortions, biases and logical fallacies: an epistemological analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24866/1997-2857/2025-2/99-107Keywords:
cognitive distortions, cognitive biases, logical fallacies, epistemology, adaptive rationality, argumentation, heuristicsAbstract
The article presents an epistemological analysis of the distinctions between «cognitive distortions», «cognitive biases», and «logical fallacies». The author highlights their differing origins, nature, and roles in cognitive processes. Cognitive distortions are linked to maladaptive beliefs and mental disorders, cognitive biases stem from heuristics under uncertainty, while logical fallacies involve violations of argumentation rules. Drawing on van Lambalgen and Stenning’s works, the study demonstrates that epistemological analysis of cognition must consider not only logical argument structure but also contextual and cognitive factors.
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References
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5. Abd-Eldayem, R.M.A., 2023. The relationship between cognitive bias and logical fallacies in Egyptian society. British Journal of Psychology Research, Vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 52–76.
6. Beck, A.T., 1976. Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York: International Universities Press.
7. Beck, A.T. et al., 1979. Cognitive therapy of depression. New York: Guilford Press.
8. Burns, D.D. and Eidelson, R.J., 1998. Why are depression and anxiety correlated? A test of the tripartite model. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 461–473.
9. Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B. and Meuffels, B., 2009. Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness: Empirical research concerning the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. Dordrecht: Springer.
10. Englich, B., Mussweiler, T. and Strack, F., 2006. Playing dice with criminal sentences: the influence of irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision-making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 188–200.
11. Epstein, S., 1994. Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, Vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 709–724.
12. Floridi, L., 2009. Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts. Synthese, Vol. 167, no. 2, pp. 317–325.
13. Kahneman, D., 2011. Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
14. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science, Vol. 185, no. 4157, pp. 1124–1131.
15. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, Vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263–291.
16. Lord, C.G., Ross, L. and Lepper, M.R., 1979. Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37, no. 11, pp. 2098–2109.
17. Nickerson, R.S., 1998. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 175–220.
18. Sullivan, M.J.L., Bishop, S.R. and Pivik, J., 2001. The pain catastrophizing scale: Development and validation. Psychological Assessment, Vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 529–543.
19. Urbánski, M., 2020. Formal modeling of human reasoning: errors, limitations and Baconian bees. Logical Investigations, Vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 106–115.
20. van Benthem, J., 2008. Logic and reasoning: do the facts matter? Studia Logica, Vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 67–84.
21. van Lambalgen, M. and Stenning, K., 2008. Human reasoning and cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
22. Wason, P.C., 1966. Reasoning. In: Foss, B.M. ed., 1966. New horizons in psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 135–151.
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